Space Weather Workshop

The Meeting of Science, Research, Applications, Operations, and Users

April 16-19, 2013 • Boulder, Colorado



Space Environment Support to NATO SSA: The Study by NATO STO/CSO SCI-229 RTG

M. Messerotti^{1,2,3} & SCI-229 RTG



¹INAF-Astronomical Observatory of Trieste, ITA ²Department of Physics, University of Trieste, ITA ³Chair, NATO STO/CSO SCI-299 RTG



Outline of the Talk

Role and Structure of NATO STO/CSO

The SCI-229 Research Task Group

Highlights of the SCI-229 Study

Conclusions and outlook




Science & Technology in NATO: The STO, its Collaborative Network and the Collaborative Support Office

Adapted Excerpt from a Presentation by René Larose, CSO Director



Science & Technology in NATO



"Scientific results cannot be used efficiently by soldiers who have no understanding of them, and scientists cannot produce results useful for warfare without an understanding of the operations."

Theodore von Kármán (1881-1963)





50th Anniversary of the Award of the First U.S. National Medal of Science




On February 18, 1963 President J.F. Kennedy presented Pr. Theodore von Kármán at the White House with the first National Medal of Science, stating:

"I know of no one else who so completely represents all the areas involved in this medal - science, engineering and education."



The NATO S&T Community since 1 July 2012







The Science and Technology Organisation








www.sto.nato.int







The STO – Building on a Long Legacy...







26 NATO Nations in STO

	O NAIO NE
ALBANIA	196
BELGIUM	
BULGARIA	
CANADA	*
CROATIA	
■ CZECH REPUBLIC	
DENMARK	
ESTONIA	
■ FRANCE	
GERMANY	_
GREECE	<u>=</u>
HUNGARY	
ITALY	

- LATVIA	I
LITHUANIA	
NORWAY	=
POLAND	
PORTUGAL	•
■ ROMANIA	
SLOVAKIA	•
SLOVENIA	•
SPAIN	<u>(6)</u>
■ THE NETHERLANDS	
■ TURKEY	C*
UNITED KINGDOM	
UNITED STATES	






STO Mission (Charter)

- To help position the Nations' and NATO's S&T investments as a strategic enabler of the knowledge and technology advantage for the defence and security posture of NATO Nations and partner Nations, by:
 - Conducting and promoting S&T activities that augment and leverage the S&T capabilities and programmes of the Alliance, of the NATO Nations and the partner Nations [...]
 - Contributing to NATO's ability to enable and influence security- and defence-related capability development and threat mitigation in [...]
 - Supporting decision-making in the NATO Nations and NATO











The STO Collaborative Network

Scientific and Technical Committees (Panels/Group)

"The Nations for the Nations and NATO"





Why Collaborative S&T in NATO?

- It federates and strengthens the Alliance by:
 - Fostering the collective address of the common S&T needs of the Alliance and its Member Nations, demonstrating solidarity
 - Forging very profound professional relationships based on trust and confidence resulting in increased efficiencies
 - Providing commonly agreed advice to National and NATO decision makers
- It leverages scarce resources while providing synergies and interoperability by:
 - Enabling cost avoidance and cost sharing
 - Finding (common) solutions for increasingly complex problems
 - Benefiting from the best (specialised) resources in the Nations
 - Allowing shorter delays in reaching conclusions

Specialisation is a reality: no one has it all






The STO Panels/Group

- AVT Applied Vehicle Technology
- HFM Human Factors and Medicine
- IST Information Systems Technology
- SAS System Analysis & Studies
- SCI Systems Concepts & Integration
- SET Sensors & Electronics Technology
- MSG Modelling and Simulation Group



Collaborative S&T Business Model







Collaborative S&T Environment



Reports & Standards

Technology Demonstrations

Educational Opportunities

A Knowledge & Information Base for NATO and the Nations


Toolbox:

- **SY:** Symposia (>100 people, 3-4 days)
- **SM:** Specialists' Meetings (<100 people, 2-3 days)
- WS: Workshops (selected participation, 2-3 days)
- TG: <u>Task Groups</u> (study group, 3 years max.)
- LS: Lecture Series (junior and mid-level scientists)
- TC: Technical Courses
- ST: Specialists' Teams (quick reaction)
- ET: Exploratory Teams





Total Number of Activities per Year





The Collaboration Support Office (CSO)







CSO Mission (STO Charter Art. 18.3)

 To provide executive and administrative support to the S&T activities conducted through the STO level 2 committees and level 3 working groups.

 In its areas of expertise, to provide assistance and support to the Science and Technology Board, its Chairperson, the Chief Scientist, and his/her office.





The CSO: the Executive Arm

- Node of the Collaborative Network
 - Makes the STO
 Collaborative Programme of
 Work (CPoW) happen
- Interface between the scientific community and the military




Science and Technology
 Knowledge Manager

Facilitate and Leverage NATO's Collaborative S&T



CSO Functional Areas

Three main functional areas





The Value of the STO CSO

- Provides executive and administrative support to the World's largest collaborative network for Defence and Security S&T
- Facilitates an average of 150 collaborative activities/year
 - Fostering the collective address of common S&T needs, demonstrating solidarity
 - Forging very profound professional relationships based on trust and confidence resulting in increased efficiencies
 - Connecting military operators with scientists
 - Leveraging huge national research investments and a vast pool of expertise
 - Providing synergies and interoperability
- Manages knowledge and supports the quick delivery of commonly agreed advice to decision makers







Systems Concepts and Integration (SCI)

- Mission: to address:
 - Advanced system concepts,
 - Systems integration,
 - Engineering techniques and technologies

across the spectrum of platforms and operating environments.







Space Capability Preservation

- LTA for Space Capability Preservation
 - Preserve space capability/situational awareness for assets used by NATO through a combination of defensive measure of space- and ground based assets.
- SCI given the lead
- Recruited a Member at Large (Dr. LEWIS)
- Established TAP and Program Committee for SCI-238



Additional SCI Space Activities

- SCI-229/TG Space Environment Support to NATO Space Situational Awareness
- SCI-ET-001 SATCOM Radio Frequency Interference Characterization in support of NATO Space Situational Awareness
- SCI-ET-002 Space Orbital Regime Awareness support to NATO Space Situational Awareness
- SCI-ET-003 Systems Integration and Data Fusion Concepts to Support a common NATO Space Situational Awareness Operating Picture





Space Environment Support to NATO Space Situational Awareness (SCI-229/RTG)

Objectives:

- Harmonizing studies related to Space Situational awareness (SSA) between ESA, EU, EDA, ESPI (European Space Policy Institute) and NATO
- Working with the NATO JAPCC (Joint Air Power Competence Centre)
- Developing a NATO SSA Technology
 Development Plan
- Educating NATO SSA "Space Officers"
- Conducting ESA/NATO/EU workshops and a final conference related to space systems, security and SSA



SCI-229 Task Group

- Topic
 - Space Environment Support to NATO SSA
- STO CSO Panel
 - Systems Concepts and Integration (SCI)
- Duration
 - 4 years (2011-2014)
- Classification
 - NATO Unclassified (NU)
- Chair
 - M. Messerotti (ITA)
- Vice-Chair
 - Ulf-Peter Hoppe (NOR)
- Technical Editor
 - Frank Jansen (DEU)
- Participating NATO Countries
 - CZE, ESP, FRA, GBR, HUN, ITA, NOR, ROM, SLO, USA


Recent Key Points of the Study

- Phenomenology
- Effects on Space Systems
- Survey of Monitoring Resources
- Predictability
- Response Protocols
- Knowledge Organisation
- System Analysis Methodology
- Tool Development Methodology
- Risk Analysis

NATO SCI-229 ANALYSIS

CHARACTERISATION OF THE SPACE ENVIRONMENT


CHARACTERISATION OF THE SPACE ENVIRONMENT



NATO SCI-229 ANALYSIS

PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPACE PERTURBATIONS

Space Weather Effects Synopsis



"In the Dark" (Cogan, 2011)

A workshop to explore the threats, vulnerabilities, and preparedness with respect to an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack or a solar storm.

Mr. Kevin Cogan

This workshop was held at the Collins Center, U.S. Army War College

DEFINING THE SPACE PERTURBATION TARGET


DEFINITION OF SPACE SYSTEM

2.2 The Three Main Parts of a **Space System**

- 2.2.1 A space-based system notionally includes three main parts:
- 1. A ground-segment to conduct command and control of the satellite.
- 2. A space-segment consisting of the satellite itself
- 3. The end-user (Figure 1).


These nodes are interconnected by electromagnetic uplinks/downlinks that carry commands, communication traffic, signals, telemetry and mission data. This is relevant because all elements of a space-based system must work in concert for reliable Fuse to the companies of the co

Figure 1: The Three Segments of **Satellite Operations**




JAPCC, Filling the Vacuum – A Framework for a NATO Space Policy, 2012

Sample Space Environment Impacts Onto Satellite-Segment Subsystems



Sample Space Environment Impacts Onto Ground-Segment Subsystems



SPACE WEATHER

MONITORING RESOURCES ANALYSIS

Ground- and Space-Based Space Weather Monitoring Systems Advanced Composition European Incoherent Explorer (ACE) Spacecraft @

European Incoherent SCATter (EISCAT) Radar



1997-? (Propellant to 2024)





ITS END OF LIFE IS AN ISSUE!


WMO Space Weather Product Portal

http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/sat/spaceweather-productportal_en.php

Portal Homepage




Product Menu by Topic



WMO Observing Systems Capability Analysis and Review Tool


http://www.wmo-sat.info/oscar/




SPACE WEATHER


PREDICTABILITY

Limited Knowledge on the Physics






Most Intense X-Ray Solar Flares Can Occur at Any Time of the




Extreme Geomagnetic Storms Can Occur at Any Time of the Cycle



SPACE PERTURBATIONS

RISK ASSESSMENT

Diversity of Risk Assessment for Civil and Military Applications



LOW PROBABILITY-HIGH IMPACT EVENTS CANNOT BE DISREGARDED!

Occurrence Probability of Extreme SWx Storms


- "Carrington-Hodgson"-like superstorms:
 - Cadence: ~ 500-600 yrs
 - From last: 153 yrs
- "1921 Great Storm"-like superstorms:
 - Cadence: ~ 100 yrs
 - From last: 91 yrs
- "1989 Storm"-like extreme storms:
 - Cadence: ~ 11 yrs
 - From last: 8 yrs



SPACE PERTURBATION IMPACTS

RESPONSE PROTOCOLS

Response Protocols (Cogan, 2011)



The Global Perspective for Civil and Military Frameworks

- CIVIL To successfully manage a catastrophic scenario, which can involve millions people for a prolonged period of time a global coordination effort is needed, based upon:
 - Preparedness on a variety of domains
 - Monitoring and prediction capabilities
 - Redundancy in critical infrastructures
 - Established recovery protocols
- MILITARY No military organisation can ignore and/or underestimate the strategical impact of such events that can create weaknesses easy be exploited by adversaries.

The Civil Framework (US framework; EU has just started)

- Coordination among diverse organisations is not trivial but works effectively.
- Common response protocols exist.
- Military Forces are involved in the process.
- Monitoring and prediction capabilities are very advanced and under continuous refinement.
- Awareness is widespread.
- Preparedness is being improved.
- Redundancy is applied as much as possible.
- Money is an issue.

NATO SCI-229-TG

KNOWLEDGE ORGANISATION AND EDUCATION



NATO SCI-229 Space ENvironment EffeCts Advisor

SENECA: A PROTOTYPE EXPERT SYSTEM

SENECA Space ENvironment EffeCts Advisor

 A prototype expert system as a knowledge support and as a didactic tool

 Its implementation requires the availability domain knowledge organised schematic form -> synoptic tables space events impacting on space systems have been costructed by SCI-229-TG

Expected Dialogue Between Space Operator (SOP) and SENECA (SEN)

SOP> *GPS* rx does not provide position since minutes

SEN> Possible causes and relevant probability:

Ionospheric perturbation 99.5%

Solar Radio Interference 0.0%

0.5% **Electronic Warfare**

SOP> Explain


SEN> Solar activity level: high;

CME hit Earth;

Geomagnetic Storm: intense, in progress;


Ionosphere: highly perturbed;

No identified space and ground activity in the theater.





Possible Evolution: From SENECA to SPOCK



BUILD-UP OF SCENARIOS BY SCI-229

SYSTEM ANALYSIS SCHEME

GENERAL SCHEME

- EVENT TYPE
 - Timing
 - Statistics
 - Monitoring
 - Prediction
- IMPACTED SUB-SYSTEMS
 - List with criticality ranking
- EFFECTS ON SUB-SYSTEMS AND SYSTEM CAPABILITIES
 - List with severity ranking, possible fixing, recovery time
- RESPONSE PROCEDURES
 - Information distribution and target
 - Decision makers
 - Mitigation actions

BUILD-UP OF SCENARIOS BY SCI-229

THE SPACE WEATHER PHENOMENOLOGY



Non-Comprehensive Synopsis


- Solar Interior
 - Solar Dynamo at Tachocline
 - Subphotospheric Convective Flows
 - Large-Scale Meridional Flows
- Solar Photosphere
 - Faculae
 - Sunspots
 - Solar Flares → EM, Particles, CME
- Solar Chromosphere
 - Solar Flares → EM, Particles, CME
 - Erupting Prominences → CME
- Solar Corona
 - Coronal Holes (CH)
 - Coronal Streamers
 - Erupting Prominences → CME
 - Coronal Mass Ejections (CME)

- Extended Solar Corona and Interplanetary Medium
 - Corotating Interaction Regions (CIR)
 - Stream Interaction Regions (SIR)
 - Interplanetary Shocks
 - Magnetic Clouds
 - Coronal Massa Ejections (CME)
- Earth Magnetosphere
 - Van Allen Belts
 - Ring Current
 - Geomagnetic Storms
- Earth Ionosphere
 - Equatorial ElectroJet (EEJ)
 - TEC variations / Scintillation
- Earth Lithosphere/Hydrosphere
 - Geomagnetically Induced Currents (GIC)

BUILD-UP OF SCENARIOS BY SCI-229

EXAMPLE OF SYSTEM ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS

Conceptual Example Analysis of Impacts on Satellite Subsystems



TOOL USABILITY

THE MOST CHALLENGING ASPECT

Tools Usability for Military Purposes

All the above stuff has to be incorporated in a smart system that is easy to be used by the non-expert operator, i.e.,

- that provides RYG¹ answers + details if required
- that can be easily used in the theatre.

Preferred development approach: KISS²

¹RYG – Red-Yellow-Green ²Keep It Simple, Stupid

RECENT WORK IN THIS FRAMEWORK BY SCI-229

PROTOTYPE SPACE SYSTEM STATUS MONITOR WEB PAGE



SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ORGANISATION

Systems Concepts and Integration


SCI-229 Task Group

Space Environment Support to NATO SSA



CLICK ON QUESTION MARK ICONS TO GET MORE INFORMATION

SPACE SYSTEM STATUS MONITOR




Copyright NATO SCI-229 Classification NUU Date 2012.11.11 **Time** 13:58Z

Contact M. Messerotti


Prototype Web GUI

Quiet Conditions

Prototype Information Pages










SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ORGANISATION


Systems Concepts and Integration





CLICK ON QUESTION MARK ICONS TO GET MORE INFORMATION

SPACE SYSTEM STATUS MONITOR




Prototype Web GUI

Perturbed Conditions



SPACE SUBSYSTEM STATUS



Information Page for Space Segment

GROUND SUBSYSTEM STATUS

SUBSYSTEM



STATUS

INFORMATION

- PROVIDE
 POSITION SINCE
 13:50Z
- · TELEMETRY AND COMMANDING ISSUES
- NO ELECTRONIC
 WARFARE
 ATTACK
- POWER FAILURE EXPECTED

Information
Page
for Ground
Segment



USER SUBSYSTEM STATUS

SUBSYSTEM



STATUS


INFORMATION

- INACCURATE **POSITIONING SINCE 13:58Z**
- NO ELECTRONIC WARFARE
- POSSIBLE SERVICE(S) INTERRUPTION

Information Page for User Segment


NATO SCI-229-TG

SPACE WEATHER EVENT RISK MANAGEMENT




THE RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS

Risk Management Process¹



¹Risk management – Principles and guidelines, ISO 31000:2009(E)




ESTABLISHING THE CONTEXT

Establishing the Context

Identifying for a specific mission:

- Involved Space Systems according to provided services
- Possible Space Environment Effects on Sp.Sys.
- Risks by Space Environment Effects
- Mitigation procedures
- Communication protocols




SPACE ENVIRONMENT AND SPACE SYSTEMS

Space Environment and Space Systems

- The design and fabrication of space systems must be oriented to obtain a system which operates in a hostile environment.
- The dependencies on space-based systems have been increasing faster than the detailed knowledge of the environment in which the systems are placed.
- Hence the vulnerability due to loss of a space capability or asset has increased as well.
- The study and analysis of the space environment are an important way to mitigate this vulnerability.
- The correct approach must consider the space system as a set of the three segments (SPS, GCS, EUS).

Simplified Synopsis of Space Weather Effects




Main Categories of Solar Radiation Events Affecting Space Systems

Associated with solar events like flares, CMEs, Coronal Holes, Coronal Streamers, etc.

- a. Electromagnetic Radiation (EMR) in the X, XUV, EUV, UV, and Radio bands.
- b. High-Energy Particle Radiation (HEPR), e.g. protons impacting the Earth's polar caps.
- c. Low- to Medium-Energy Particle Radiation (L/MEPR), e.g. protons and electrons channelled to the Earth's mid latitudes.

Solar Radiation Events Characteristics

	EM ² Radiation	High-Energy	L/M-Energy	
Location	Sunlit	sunlit (Polar Caps)	nighttime	
Arrival time	Immediately	15 min to hours	2-4 days	
Duration	1-2 hour	few days	several days	
Particles	x-rays/UV ³ /radio burst	protons	protons/electrons	
	SATCOM ⁴	SAT Disorientation	S/C Charging	
Effects	RADAR	S/C ⁵ Damage	SAT Drag	
	SRF ⁶	RADIO B/O ⁷	Power B/O	



RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT

Definition of Risk

Effect of uncertainty on objectives¹

- Uncertainty can be caused by
 - Events, e.g. hazards, threats
 - Lack or ambiguity of information
 - Action or inaction

- Effect on objectives is
 - Partial to total missing

¹Risk management – Principles and guidelines, ISO 31000:2009(E)

Definition of Risk


$$R_{total} = \mathop{a}\limits_{i} L_{i} p(L_{i})$$

R Total Risk Value


L_i Loss by event i

p(L_i) Occurrence probability of loss by event i

Mission Risk Analysis



Risk Assessment & Management



MANAGEMENT PRIORITY

Risk Assessment & Management in the NATO Framework

EVENT		RELEVANCE OF IMPACT FOR MISSION			
		Unaffected	Important	Essential	Critical
	Low	?	?	?	?
PROBABILITY	Medium	?	?	?	?
PROBABILITY	High	?	?	?	?
	Very High	?	?	?	?

PRIORITY ASSIGNMENT IS THE MOST CHALLENGING EXERCISE DUE TO:

- THE VARIETY OF NATURAL EVENTS.
- THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS AMONG EVENT CATEGORIES.
- THE VARIETY OF POTENTIALLY AFFECTED SUBSYSTEMS.
- THE VARIETY OF POSSIBLE IMPACTS.
- THE POSSIBILITY OF CASCADING EFFECTS OF IMPACTS.
- THE VARIETY OF POSSIBLE PRIORITY PERSPECTIVES ACCORDING TO THE MISSION SCENARIO AND GOALS.

Space Environment Risk Analysis and Evaluation

 Risk analysis and evaluation are to provide quantitative/qualitative risk levels for the considered events (SWx, NEOs, SDs) within the framework of interest


 Very difficult to be carried out for natural hazards whose <u>observations</u> are relatively <u>fragmentary</u>, and whose <u>physics</u> <u>knowledge</u> is <u>quite limited</u>

Space Environment Risk Treatment


Identification of possible mitigation techniques

 To date, most SWx, NEOs, and SDs events for their intrinsic nature <u>do not</u> <u>allow any mitigation technique</u>


An Integrated Approach for Risk Assessment



Perturbation in the Sun-Earth Space Environment



A Sample Use Case



Conclusions and Outlook

- We have been considering the space environment risks in the framework of NATO needs.
- This exercise has been carried out for SWx, NEOs, and SDs events.
- The risk analysis and evaluation is <u>challenging</u> for the lack of comprehensive observations and lack of deep physical understanding for the majority of phenomena.
- Notwithstanding, a first evaluation is in progress based on the available knowledge and will serve as a basis for future refinements.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION!