

The Impact of the Halloween Storms on Radiation Exposure in Aviation: 10 Years After

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Outline

- ▶ Introduction
- ▶ Case Study (GLE 65, 29 October 2003)
- ▶ Lessons Learnt
- ▶ Summary



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


Space Weather Impacts on Aviation

- ➡ Ionospheric effects (communications, navigation)
- ➡ Ionising Radiation (biological effects, avionics)
- 🌐 Ground infrastructure (power supply, airports, ATM, etc.)



Comparison of Radiation Exposure



Background Information: Radiation Protection in Aviation

- Characterization of radiation field by dose quantities (D , E , $H^*(10)$, dD/dt , dE/dt , $dH^*(10)/dt$, etc.)
- Radiation field in dependence on GCR and solar cycle is well understood
- Radiation protection and dose limits regulated by EU law
- Dose quantities can be assessed by measurement or calculation
- Several models for additional SWx contributions (GLEs)



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Background: October 2003

TV reported on SPEs and gave rise to public awareness all over the world.

Due to the public pressure some airlines even operated their flights at lower altitudes between 29. and 31. October.



GLE 65: 28./29. October 2003



Some airlines just started flying at lower altitudes !

What are we supposed to do ?




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GOES11 Proton Flux (5 minute data)

Begin: 2003 Oct 28 0000 UTC



Updated 2003 Oct 30 23:56:03 UTC

NOAA/SEC Boulder, CO USA

NOAA Space Weather Scale for Solar Radiation Storms

Category	Effect	Physical measure	Average Frequency (1 cycle = 11 years)
Scale	Descriptor	Duration of event will influence severity of effects	Flux level of ≥ 10 10^3 particles $(\text{cm}^2 \text{s}^{-1} \text{sr}^{-1})$
Solar Radiation Storms			
S5	Extreme	<p>High-level: noticeable high radiation levels to astronauts on ISS, crew radiation exposure, high radiation exposure to passengers and crew on commercial jet of high latitude approximately 10 days or longer if possible.</p> <p>Low-level operations: satellite may be disabled within secondary systems on some type of orbit. All other critical data storage and data values may be unable to be recovered post-event. Recovery to full capacity possible.</p> <p>Other systems: single-point failures of HF (high frequency) comms may not be possible through the polar region, and position may not be recoverable via satellite communication.</p>	10^2 Fewer than 1 per cycle
S4	Severe	<p>High-level: noticeable radiation levels to astronauts on ISS, elevated radiation exposure to passengers and crew on commercial jet of high latitude approximately 10 days or longer if possible.</p> <p>Low-level operations: may experience secondary device problems and/or on-orbit problems, may be unable to recover any cause secondary problems, and data post recovery may be degraded.</p> <p>Other systems: likelihood of HF radio communication through the polar region and increased degradation across some services, data is likely.</p>	10^1 3 per cycle
S3	Strong	<p>High-level: radiolysis of sensitive systems noted for satellites on ISS, passengers and crew on commercial jet of high latitude may receive low-level radiation exposure (approximately 1 hour or less).</p> <p>Low-level operations: single-point specific solar on-orbit system, and slight reduction of efficiency in solar panel, is likely.</p> <p>Other systems: degraded HF radio communication through the polar region and on-orbit problems may occur.</p>	10^0 10 per cycle
S2	Moderate	<p>High-level: none.</p> <p>Low-level operations: subsequent single-point specific possible.</p> <p>Other systems: small effects on HF propagation through the polar region and corruption of polar map location possibly affected.</p>	10^0 25 per cycle
S1	Minor	<p>High-level: none.</p> <p>Low-level operations: none.</p> <p>Other systems: minor impacts on HF radio in the polar region.</p>	10 50 per cycle

* Flux levels are 5 minute average. Flux is particles $\text{cm}^{-2} \text{s}^{-1} \text{sr}^{-1}$. Based on this measure, but other physical measures are also considered.
 ** These events can last more than one day.



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NOAA Space Weather Scale for Solar Radiation Storms

Category	Effect	Physical measure	Average Frequency (1 cycle = 11 years)
Scale	Description	Duration of event will influence severity of effects	
Solar Radiation Storms			
		Flux level of ≥ 10 10^{10} particles $(\text{cm}^2 \cdot \text{s})^{-1}$	Number of events when flux level is reached (number of storm days**)
S5	Extreme Highlights: unavoidable high radiation hazard to astronauts on EVA; elevated radiation exposure to passengers and crew in commercial jets at high latitudes (approximately 10 chest x-rays) is possible. Satellite operations: satellites may be rendered useless, secondary systems may be damaged, data may be corrupted, data may be lost, data may be corrupted, data may be lost, data may be corrupted. Other systems: blackout of HF radio communications through the polar region, and navigation errors over several days are likely.	10^7	Fewer than 1 per cycle
S4	Severe Highlights: unavoidable radiation hazard to astronauts on EVA; elevated radiation exposure to passengers and crew in commercial jets at high latitudes (approximately 10 chest x-rays) is possible. Satellite operations: may experience memory device problems and noise on imaging systems; star-tracker problems may cause orientation problems, and solar panel efficiency can be degraded. Other systems: blackout of HF radio communications through the polar region and increased navigation errors over several days are likely.	10^6	3 per cycle
S3	Strong Highlights: radiation exposure to astronauts on EVA; elevated radiation exposure to passengers and crew in commercial jets at high latitudes (approximately 10 chest x-rays) is possible. Satellite operations: single-event upsets, noise on imaging systems, and slight reduction of efficiency in solar panel are likely. Other systems: degraded HF radio communications through the polar region and navigation errors over several days are likely.	10^5	10 per cycle
S2	Moderate Highlights: none. Satellite operations: subsequent single-event upsets possible. Other systems: small effects on HF propagation through the polar region and navigation errors over several days are likely.	10^4	25 per cycle
S1	Minor Highlights: none. Satellite operations: none. Other systems: minor effects on HF radio in the polar region.	10	50 per cycle

* Flux levels are 5 minute average. Flux in particles/cm²·sec. Based on this measure, but other physical measures are also considered.
** These events can last more than one day.

S 4	Severe	<p>Biological: unavoidable radiation hazard to astronauts on EVA; elevated radiation exposure to passengers and crew in commercial jets at high latitudes (approximately 10 chest x-rays) is possible.</p> <p>Satellite operations: may experience memory device problems and noise on imaging systems; star-tracker problems may cause orientation problems, and solar panel efficiency can be degraded.</p> <p>Other systems: blackout of HF radio communications through the polar regions and increased navigation errors over several days are likely.</p>	10 ⁴
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


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Oulu Neutron Monitor

pressure corrected data

1-minute data → 20-minute averages




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Oulu Neutron Monitor

pressure corrected data

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


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Oulu Neutron Monitor

pressure corrected data

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


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
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
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
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Atmospheric Shielding: Range of Protons in the Atmosphere



What energy is relevant (Simulation with PANDOCA)?



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Lessons learnt

- Significant increase in dose rates -> strong GLE (not GLE 65)
- Operational satellite data -> different scenario (lower energy)
- Particle spectra during the Halloween storms were soft (!)
- Nowcast models for dose rates have been developed (not op.)
- Incomplete information + public pressure = inappropriate reaction



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Summary

- SPEs with a significant high energy component are still **unpredictable !!!**
- Solar Particle Events can cause temporary increases in radiation exposure at aviation altitudes as a function of the corresponding energy spectrum.
- Warnings should be based on dose rates instead of particle flux (need for internationally accepted trigger threshold(s), e.g. dose rate < 0.2 mSv/h, flight dose < 0.5 mSv, etc.).
- Nowcast models for dose rates at aviation altitudes have been developed and have to be made operational (ground monitors, IT-infrastructure, action plan, etc.).
- International coordination in case of a significant Solar Particle Event (SPE) is highly recommended (dose assessment, communication, etc.).



Questions, etc.



Paracelsus (1538):

“Dosis sola facit venenum“

(The dose alone makes the poison)

